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One of the Greatest Fraud Case in the World:The Imar Bank Case from Turkey  Goksel Yucel      Burcu Adiloglu* Accounting Department, School of Business, Istanbul University, Avcilar- Istanbul, Turkey  This work was supported by Scientific Research Projects Coordination Unit of Istanbul University. Project number was 45181. Abstract Turkey, a bridge between two continents, has experienced severe bouts of financial instability and came across into a severe financial crisis in 2001.  During the 1998-2001 period 20 banks were transferred to the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF) due to the erosion of their equity. These banks, the half of the 40 commercial banks of Turkey which are operating at that time, were also audited. Except for one or two of these banks all had judicial process because of their improper loans, etc. operations. In 2002, after triple auditing (two independent auditing companies and a sworn bank auditor)  robust banks continued their activities. Imar Bank which was the one of these banks also was transferred to the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund in 2003. Imar Bank produced false financial statements to the creditors of the banks, including its depositors, and misleading reports to the supervisory authorities over a prolonged period. Fraudulent reporting of the bank showed that the management was able to misappropriate funds not reported in the financial statements by failing to account for a substantial volume of deposits. The examination revealed that there were discrepancies between the official deposit balances and actual balances. Total deposits of the bank amounted approximately 1,1 billion dollars according to the audited balance sheet prepared by the bank. However, based on the examination, the real amount was much higher than the reported. The actual amount was 6,1 billion dollars and 5 billion dollars  was unregistered. Deposits were paid to depositors by the government.  Unfortunately, it was the one of the greatest fraud case in banking sector in the world. During this crisis period it is indicated that there was a defect in the banking sector with regard to transparency. In this paper it is briefly discussed the underlying reasons behind this fraudulent reporting of Imar Bank and the failure of banking regulation and supervision functions in the country.  Keywords: Fraud, fraudulent reporting, Imar Bank, Turkey     1. Introduction There are many fraud cases in the history of economic systems due to the lack of successful control systems. Imar Bank scandal, ten years ego, was probably the greatest fraudulent financial reporting case in the banking history. Turkey, officially the Republic of Turkey is a contiguous transcontinental country. Its larger part (sometimes called Anatolia) is in Western Asia, and the smaller (sometimes called East Thrace) in Southeastern Europe. Turkey is a member of the Council of Europe, NATO, OECD and the G-20 major economies. Turkey began full membership negotiations with the European Union in 2003, having been an associate member of the European Economic Community since 1963 and having joined the EU Customs Union in 1995. 2013 estimated basic key figures as are: Population 77 million (greatest city Istanbul 14 million), area 302,535 sq miles, GDP per capita $19. Before 10-15 years ago the country was shocked by bankruptcies of twenty private commercial banks which were the half of the kind of the banking companies.   2. A Brief History of Banking System in Turkey during 1990's Turkey had an average inflation rate 50 % for thirty years (from 1973 to 2003). One of the main economic problems of the government was the high foreign and domestic debt rates of the state. During the first half of 1990's there was approximately 70-80 banks in finance system of the country, few of them were state owned, most of them were family companies. The supervising agency for the banks was Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey. The main financing source of the banks were foreign loans instead of saving deposits and  the main investments were the Government bonds or bills because of high real interest rates of these kinds of financial instruments. And they used these high rated financial assets also  for repurchase arrangements. The banks were not willing to give loans. Briefly, economic structure problems occurred a weak, corrupted, unhealthy banking system. There was a great lack in adequate accounting standards. Although high inflation rates there were no regulations for inflation adjustments or disclosure of restated financial statements.  There was an independent auditing system of the banks designed in 1986 by Central Bank but based on poor accounting standards. In the second half of 1990's about 20 banks went to bankruptcy like a domino effect. Except few of them, in most of the banks were transactions not allowed by the law, back to back loans etc. The saving deposits were guaranteed fully by the government agency, Saving Deposits Insurance Fund (SDIF), which was under the umbrella of Central Bank and restructured as independent agency in the year 2003. Because of strong crisis in the financial sector of economy the Banking Regulations and Supervision Agency (BRSA) was established in 
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2000 and our story began... After bankruptcies in 20 banks, BRSA set up some new regulations. First they prepared its own Accounting Standards based on IFRS's with some little differences. And for the year end of 2001 they set up strong regulations with the independent audit procedures. BRSA accepted the year end for a new era in banking sector. According the specific regulations for 2001 all financial reports of the banks would be audited by an independent auditor, which would be selected by the bank. During this period there was approximately 100 audit companies which were authorized for independent audit of the banks, including Big Four (Big Five in this year). In the next step BRSA selected a second audit company to audit the audit work of the first audit company. And in the third step the Sworn Bank Auditors (government officers) had the right to control the audit procedures of the first two steps. As result of these strong procedures it was determined one of the banks (Pamukbank) was also in bankruptcy and all assets and liabilities of the bank was transferred to SDIF, because of high level of non-performing loans. The remaining banking companies were strong enough. The list of these 54 banks is given in Exhibit 1 (Banks Association of Turkey, 2003). Our case, our example, Imar Bank was on of these banks with sufficient ratios. In the report of BRSA it was especially highlighted: "According to the Program for Strengthening Banks' Capitals the banking companies were audited in three steps and except Pamukbank all of them are strong enough." (BRSA Report, 2002)  3. History of Imar Bank Imar Bank was established in 1928 with the full name of Turkey Imar (Reconstruction) Bank Inc.  In 1984 the bank was purchased by one of the rapidly developing economic groups of Turkey, Uzan family (group). Uzan Group owned in 1990's media, energy, cement and construction companies, totally 233. Two of the energy companies (Cukurova and Kepez) were operated with the license of the Government, and they were among big sized companies of the country. Telsim was one of the two GSM companies of Turkey. The group owned also a soccer (football) team in the Super League of Turkey, Istanbulspor. Imar Bank was a financial institution, which has offered the highest interest rates for saving deposits. Because of many suspecting transactions of the Imarbank, the company was closely watched by government agencies. But as explained above, Imarbank had no problems with its financial position as of the and of 2001.  The next year end, 2002 everything with banking operations and financial positions was seemed normal, except the loss amounting 92 trillion Turkish Lira ($ 56 million). In the independents auditors' report it was mentioned (Imar Bank's Financials and Independent Auditors' Report for 2002, Istanbul, 28 April 2003) Türkiye İmar Bankası A.Ş. (Imar Bank) Independent Auditors' Report for the period 1 January - 31 December 2002  (last paragraph)  In our opinion the accompanying financial statements present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of Türkiye İmar Bankası A.Ş. (Imarbank) as of December 31, 2002 and the results of its operations and cash flow for the year ended in accordance with the prevailing accounting principles and  standards set up as per the existing regulations described in Article 13 of the Banking Act and other regulations.  Istanbul, 28 April 2003  Gözlem Independent Auditing and Consultancy Company A.Atlı, Partner  4. Signals in 1990's The collapse of Imar Bank as such was not a major surprise to close watchers of the Turkish banking sector but the financial damage that resulted and the way it took place was truly shocking. The takeover as such was not a big surprise because Imar Bank had been on the Treasury’s watch-list – the regulatory authority before the BRSA was established – for almost ten years, as its loan portfolio, characterized by an exceptional connected-lending practice, consisted mainly of (direct and indirect) loans to companies owned by the Uzan Group Once the BRSA was established, the new authority requested that Imar Bank shareholders re-capitalize the bank and reduce exposure to the Uzan Group. As no action was taken on either front, BRSA appointed a board member with veto powers in July 2001 and another representative was appointed to the board in December 2001. In 2002, during the May recap program, the bank reduced its risk to Uzan Group companies; shareholders injected capital into Imar Bank and the BRSA decided to withdraw the board member with veto powers in August 2002. With a BRSA representative still on the board, the problem seemed resolved and a takeover was avoided. (Steinherr et 
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al.,2004)   5. Transfer to the SDIF (June 2003-July 2003)  The bank was hit again in June 2003 when the charters of the two regional power companies (Çukurova and Kepez), which provided the bulk of the cash flow of the Uzan companies, were revoked by the Electricity Regulatory Board, July 12, 2003. This news led to a run on the bank and liquidity problems resulted. The board members of Imar Bank refused to cooperate with the BRSA and resigned their posts in late June. Meanwhile, the BRSA had only four board members and could not take a decision because a decision required at least five members. Upon the appointment by the government of the fifth member, the BRSA cancelled the deposit-taking license of Imar Bank and declared that all personal deposits were under government guarantee. (Steinherr et al.,2004) During this period, Uzan family tried to transfer their own shares in Imar Bank (about 99% of total shares) to the employees of Imar Bank and Uzan Group.  After strong inspections and controls of Imar Bank's accounting and IT systems, the SDIF has determined these followings:  a) There was an organization chart in the bank but it had no meaning because most of the major duties  belongs to board of directors. b) The qualifications of the employees of the Imar Bank were not sufficient enough to manage the bank because the main operation of the bank was to finance the companies of Uzan Group.  c) Merkez Yatırım (Merkez Yatırım Inc.),  IT Company of Uzan Group was providing IT services of the accounting system of Imar Bank. but there was no written contract between Imar Bank and MerkezYatırım. d) There were accounting systems in Imar Bank branches but the main system was in Merkez Yatırım and it controlled all the data of branches. e) IT system was also controlled by the top management of Imar Bank, by this authority they changed all the accounting records and manipulated.     f) Data processing center destroyed by the bank’s managers. In addition to this, all of the legal books  and main and auxiliary records were either shifted away or destroyed and they have never reached. 
 Figure 1.Manipulation of accounting records Source: Aktan et al.,2009; BRSA (2003), Endeavors to Strengthen Turkish Banking Sector and The Imar Bank Case (in Turkish), Presentation, October. Two programs were used in manipulating data. One of them was used for showing deposits, taxes to be paid and expenditure accountings lower by giving fictitious debit-receivable records. The other one was used to delete bond transactions from subsidiary records. Legal ledger samples such as subsidiary ledgers, balance, book of final entry etc.,which were produced by using manipulated data were delivered to the branches. The branches transferred all records displaying actual data to the main memory existing in the top management . Deposits (time andsaving) amount was reduced based on account through a program called GM04 that only a few people were authorized to use. Adverse records were issued for the required date, sum, account and branch. Some 
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phrases such as “account closing” and “paid” were put on the subsidiary ledgers sent to the branches for the records produced by using GM04 and any remark was not provided. (see Figure 1). g) Total deposits of the bank amounted approximately 1,1 billion dollars according to the audited balance  sheet prepared by the bank. However, based on the examination, the real amount was much higher than the reported. The actual amount was 6,1  billion dollars and 5  billion dollars  was unregistered.  Exhibit 2 shows the balance sheet of Imar Bank as of July 3, 2003, according to bank records and after adjustments by SDIF  
The examinations revealed that the bank’s information technology (IT) firm, which was a group company that solely did business with the bank, had partly deleted and damaged the magnetic records of the bank during the takeover. A double record-keeping system was discovered: one official, one unofficial. That is to say, the bank had a double accounting system where the true information existed at the branch level, but headquarters falsified it and then reported it to BRSA. All previous onsite examinations were also done through the fake records. (Hayali et al. , 2012)  As a result of this destroying process, it was proved rather difficult for the government officials to investigate and audit the bank’s records.  Investigations carried out under such difficult circumstances showed 
Exhibit 2    IMARBANK     Balance sheet as of July 3, 2003     (thousand Turkish Lira = US $ 719)           according to after adjustments     Bank records  by SDIF Cash on hand and in the Central Bank 171.598 2.931 Financial assets held for trading   -108.672 28 Banks     913.085 10.638 Loans       514.080 514.717 Non-performing loans    4,548 907.080 Allowance for non-performing loans -4.548 -907.080 Investments in associates   415 415 Investments in subsidiaries   835 835 Reserve deposits in the Central Bank 60.728 59.545 Other receivables     94 59 Accrued interest receivables   131.931 3 Fixed assets     15.570 15.570 Intangibles    53 53 Other assets     533.417 7.688.233 Total assets     2.233.134 8.292.427       Deposits     1.567.254 8.443.802 Miscellaneous payables   741.752 898.820 Other liabilities    286 286 Tax liability     37.967 37.857 Accrued interest payable   307.118 316.163 Provisions       4.979 7.697.488 Shareholders' equity     -426.222 -9.101.989 Total liabilities and shareholders' equity 2.233.134 8.292.427       Deposits (expressed in US $) 1.126.710 6.070.310     US $  1,1 billion US $ 6,1 billion       Amount of deposits not recorded in official books  US $ 5,0 billion 
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that the documents and records submitted by the bank to government officials were simply manipulated by the former administrative officers of the bank and that the bank had collected from the ordinary folk, under the name of deposits and treasury bond sale, much more than it was initially recorded in the bank’s financial books and records, and that the taxes collected from such depositors by means of stoppage were not at all passed on to fiscal authority (SDIF, Imar Bank, 2009) The examination revealed that there were discrepancies between the official deposit balances and actual balances on July 3, 2003, SDIF took into consideration official records reported to BRDA. It is important to note that the deposits had been guaranteed by SDIF.  After it was seen that many of the depositors accounts were not stated in official records, on August 4, 2004 their own documents started to be collected by depositors and it was obvious that deposit collection process is hidden from the public authority. Therefore Imar Bank rose as a Turkey's fifth largest bank by its total saving deposit.  Deposits were paid to more than 300,000 depositors by the insurance fund. However, investors who bought government bonds were not paid at that time, because those were not deposits and were not covered by the insurance. In 2007, a law was enacted by the parliament that requires the Treasury to make payments to bond holders. (Ayaz,2008) The president of Turkey's Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF), Ahmet Ertürk, said in an interview "What happened in (the Imar Bank incident) was a chain of corruption and irregularity that was set to disrupt the entire financial system of the country". Ertürk also notes that there is not any other example of deposits that kept off the record in the world.  In 1990, the Capital Market Board cancelled the license of Imar Bank to sell government securities to its customers. However, the bank itself, even after the withdrawal of its license, advertised sales of government securities to customers and apparently conducted ascertain volume of such business. The Istanbul Stock Exchange also continued to register such transactions. The securities were alleged to be held by the bank to the order of customers. There is no process for verifying the existence of securities in such cases. Second important issue in this Imar Bank fraud case is to sell government securities without any license.  It is amazing that all of the previous audit reports of the bank were unqualified. One other important fraudulent act realized in this case is less important than first two issues as mentioned above. Because of all these unofficial records tax evasion was being done in this country.   6. SDIF's Liquidation Process More than 200 companies of the Uzan Group were seized for six years (2003-2009) by the SDIF after it was discovered that the Uzan's fraudulent banking operations. From the liquidation assets of the Uzan Group SDIF generated cash amounting 6,2 billion dollars. For example Telsim (GSM operator) sold to Vodafone, media companies (including Star TV, the first private TV channel of Turkey), energy and construction companies also a soccer club sold in this period. Although Uzan Group's judicial process because of their improper loans, etc. operations SDIF was successful in liquidation process. But it is not easy to say that the Imar Bank's judicial process because of the improper operations has successful results. Only some of the middle level managers were subject to prison penalties while the main have fled abroad and still have not found. We think Imar Bank is an unique and huge fraud case in the World banking history in which the saving deposits amounting $ 5 billion were not recoded in official books.   7. Conclusion Imar Bank has been a major case a private commercial bank whose real records revealed, only upon the intervention of the banking authority (OECD, 2004) The Imar Bank scandal, which took place  during 1990's and at the beginning of 2000's, was one the greatest banking corruption case in the history of the Turkish Republic. During this period it was indicated that there was a defect in the banking sector with regard to transparency. The Imar Bank case suggested a number of changes were needed to the legal framework, the financial and human resources devoted to supervision, and, most importantly in this case, to the management and organization of the supervisory process. After this scandal many new issues which are related to transparency such as implementing International Financial Reporting Standards, audits regarding International standards, risk management, internal controls, corporate governance etc. had taken place within the banking system.  In addition to these, with BRSA processes to establish a bank has been made difficult, tight regulations have been imposed for the issue of banking licenses, which had been easier before the crises. After all these regulations, today banking is probably the most reliable, successful and attractive sector in Turkish economy.  References: Aktan, B., Masood, O., Yilmaz, S.(2009), Financial shenanigans and the failure of ethics in banking: a review and synthesis of an unprecedented fraud, Banks and Bank Systems, Volume 4, Issue 1. Ayaz,M.,(2008),  Lessons From a Fraud Case in Turkey, ISACA. 
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Exhibit 1         List of the Turkish Banks as of December 31, 2002 (ranked by total assets)     (billion TL = US $ 610 as of Dec.31,.2002 )        
  Bank Estab. Year Total Assets      (billion TL) 
Total loans (billion TL) Total deposits  (billion TL) Total equity (billion TL) Net income/loss (billion TL) Branches Number of employees                     1 T.C. Ziraat Bankası A.Ş. 1863 37.689.012 4.763.903 27.957.076 4.161.008 156.295 1.173 23.330 2 Akbank T.A.Ş. 1947 24.452.559 6.282.849 16.595.823 3.248.938 685.448 626 9.011 3 Türkiye İş Bankası A.Ş. 1924 23.731.290 7.234.647 16.720.074 4.247.536 310.816 839 14.873 4 T. Garanti Bankası A.Ş. 1946 19.563.059 5.658.648 13.163.403 1.678.355 123.074 304 7.407 5 Yapı ve Kredi Bankası A.Ş. 1944 18.825.275 7.086.165 12.987.504 2.739.012 1.101.454 419 10.435 6 Türkiye Halk Bankası A.Ş. 1938 17.409.175 1.206.394 11.466.915 1.827.468 593.718 546 9.228 7 T. Vakıflar Bankası T.A.O. 1954 12.733.306 3.388.647 9.454.079 758.939 306.100 300 7.600 8 Koçbank A.Ş. 1985 6.654.246 2.480.747 4.459.633 399.371 -149.132 134 3.257 9 Pamukbank T.A.Ş. 1955 5.810.297 1.631.375 5.838.131 -1.211.840 -2.056.591 194 4.974 10 Finans Bank A.Ş. 1987 4.926.857 1.733.860 3.658.454 535.196 188.426 126 2.811 11 Türk Eximbank 1987 4.597.470 3.684.934 0 1.104.206 106.059 2 370 12 T. Dış Ticaret Bankası A.Ş. 1964 3.894.487 1.241.702 2.240.932 568.886 81.942 147 2.735 13 Oyak Bank A.Ş. 1984 3.518.921 1.074.697 2.773.864 413.799 37.409 221 3.590 14 Bayındırbank A.Ş. 1958 3.499.840 267.028 946.223 585.941 379.978 9 912 15 Denizbank A.Ş. 1997 3.371.191 838.960 2.607.741 399.685 17.274 161 2.860 16 HSBC Bank A.Ş. 1990 3.169.005 1.411.971 1.893.509 738.391 30.048 163 3.525 17 Türk Ekonomi Bankası A.Ş. 1927 2.373.182 801.872 1.691.487 255.785 18.514 75 1.673 18 Şekerbank T.A.Ş. 1953 2.191.348 493.300 1.856.022 103.830 10.343 196 2.948 19 İller Bankası 1933 1.845.493 1.212.575 0 1.035.889 358.077 1 3.004 20 T. Sınai Kalkınma BankA.Ş. 1950 1.604.475 817.529 0 199.715 18.063 3 302 21 Citibank N.A. 1980 1.457.406 483.816 1.045.259 215.181 32.678 24 1.064 22 Alternatif Bank A.Ş. 1992 1.247.543 300.312 851.119 40.730 10.125 23 486 23 Türkiye İmar Bankası T.A.Ş. 1928 1.158.024 610.996 976.043 148.005 -92.958 169 1.521 24 Anadolubank A.Ş. 1996 1.142.887 329.952 974.608 66.173 16.974 48 826 25 Tekstil Bankası A.Ş. 1986 1.082.031 322.265 751.191 94.669 58.473 35 840 26 Tekfenbank A.Ş. 1992 567.388 132.409 437.981 61.567 16.963 33 654 27 T. Kalkınma Bankası A.Ş. 1975 448.620 171.046 0 329.644 -52.107 1 800 28 Bnp-Ak Dresdner Bank A.Ş. 1985 443.683 47.399 187.363 95.792 20.552 2 105 29 Abn Amro Bank N.V. 1921 309.955 22.801 63.201 73.367 -935 1 117 30 Turkish Bank A.Ş. 1982 300.628 10.955 240.704 46.450 2.563 13 183 31 Arap Türk Bankası A.Ş. 1977 290.641 38.500 56.309 47.884 2.873 3 177 32 WestLB AG 1990 287.058 160.636 133.234 27.181 4.850 1 75 33 Adabank A.Ş. 1985 280.046 90.962 183.428 70.328 -6.434 82 516 34 Credit Agricole Indosuez  1990 222.268 73.005 0 15.168 -3.436 1 30 35 Deutsche Bank A.Ş. 1988 219.011 23.408 0 50.215 9.671 1 29 36 Takas ve Saklama Bankası  1995 214.721 7.801 0 120.873 23.806 1 230 37 Société Générale (SA) 1989 158.855 26.975 7.624 36.170 36 1 50 
  Bank Estab. Year Total Assets      (billion TL) 
Total loans (billion TL) Total deposits  (billion TL) Total equity (billion TL) Net income/loss (billion TL) Branches Number of employees           38 MNG Bank A.Ş. 1991 132.968 59.810 79.057 43.548 2.329 6 179 39 Credit Suisse First Boston 1998 122.266 0 0 30.995 -5.018 1 24 40 Bank Mellat 1982 115.069 28.946 33.339 11.309 2.072 3 39 41 JPMorgan Chase Bank 1984 97.662 0 6.346 37.939 2.374 1 43 42 Nurol Yatırım Bankası A.Ş. 1999 67.674 21.251 0 35.231 1.404 3 50 43 Banca di Roma S.P.A. 1911 65.720 21.082 16.842 10.969 -1.736 1 31 44 GSD Yatırım Bankası A.Ş. 1998 59.168 42.556 0 23.909 1.004 1 30 45 Çalık  Yatırım Bankası A.Ş. 1999 58.352 3.962 0 31.563 4.951 1 24 46 Fiba Bank A.Ş. 1985 57.431 14.608 19.310 31.885 -2.755 2 64 47 ING Bank N.V. 1997 47.128 2.807 4.674 32.835 -2.475 1 26 48 C Kredi ve Kalk. Bankası  1999 38.215 3.028 0 10.255 -1.407 1 24 49 Diler Yatırım Bankası A.Ş. 1998 34.628 1.746 0 31.973 -201 1 20 50 Habib Bank Limited 1983 27.249 2.718 2.337 6.459 389 1 14 51 BankEuropa Bankası A.Ş. 1984 24.661 112 3.088 20.956 -3.023 2 97 52 Taib Yatırım Bank A.Ş. 1987 17.467 1.629 0 3.266 -834 1 18 53 Tat Yatırım Bankası A.Ş. 1992 10.587 446 0 3.640 -448 1 11 54 Credit Lyonnais Turkey 1987 7.990 529 4.061 2.409 -637 1 29   Total   212.675.488 56.370.271 142.387.988 25.698.648 2.356.998 6.106 123.271 
